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I. INTRODUCTION
W TH THE ENACTMENT of the Airline Deregulation Act of
1978,1 Congress deregulated important business aspects of
the U.S. commercial airline industry, including rates, routes,
and services. Airline deregulation in turn stimulated the use of
computer reservation systems ("CRS") 2 as newly-deregulated air-
* Attorney, Hunton & Williams LLP, Litigation, Intellectual Property, and
Antitrust Group. J.D., cum laude, University of Miami School of Law. Thanks to
Barry Davidson, Esq., Gregory 0. Principato, Samuel A. Danon, Esq., andJohn T.
Houchin, Esq. Thanks also to Kerri-Ann Philp and Marilyn Plantada. This article
was written solely in the author's personal capacity and not on behalf of or at the
request of another. The author welcomes comments at travich@hunton.com.
1 Pub. L. No. 950-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 49 U.S.C.).
2 The acronym "CRS" is synonymous with "GDS" or "global distribution sys-
tems," which are globalized CRSs. CRSs represent a network of "ARSs" or "airline
reservation systems," which airlines made available to travel agents. Hereinafter,
depending upon the context, "CRS" refers either generally to computer reserva-
tion hardware and software or specifically to reservation systems themselves, for
example, Amadeus and/or Sabre.
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lines found in CRSs a critical distribution channel through
which to efficiently and effectively communicate fares and book
passengers. The government did not also reform its regulation
of CRSs, however, prompting deregulation proponents to make
the dramatic characterization that:
[J]ust before the crypt of the Civil Aeronautics Board ["CAB"]
finally slammed shut, a gnarled hand reached up and grabbed
the airline reservations network. On November 14, [1984], only
six weeks before its demise, the board put into effect its final reg-
ulations governing airline-owned computer reservations systems.
And although the CAB gave up the ghost on regulating the air-
lines themselves, it has bequeathed to its institutional successor,
the Department of Transportation ["DOT"], a tight grip on the
airlines' main means of booking customers.4
Market power and antitrust concerns prompted the DOT to
interpose regulations between airlines and CRSs for the benefit
of consumers in the first place. The DOT's CRS regulations
continued for twenty years. As of July 31, 2004, however, the
airline CRS industry, a "poster child of unintended conse-
quences of government regulation,"' will be deregulated en-
tirely.6 As detailed below, the practical as well as the theoretical
policy underpinnings of CRS regulation became unsustainable,
eroding principally because of consumer use of the Internet as a
shopping tool and a concomitant divestment of airlines from
CRS ownership. This article applauds CRS deregulation in the
United States and records the free-market-based impulses moti-
vating the DOT's policy shift.
Four circumstances prompted CRS deregulation and made
clear that the "[t]ime has come to see what competition looks
3 See, e.g., Paul V. Mifsud, Computer Reservations Systems and Automated Market
Distribution in a Deregulated Aviation Industry, 1 J.L. & TECH. 143 (1986); see also P.
EHLERS, COMPUTERIZED RESERVATION SYSTEMS IN THE AIR TRANSPORT INDUSTRY 15
(1988).
4 Airline Reservation Systems: Curse of the Mommy Tomb, 9 REGULATION 8 (Jan./
Feb. 1985) [hereinafter Curse of the Mommy Tomb]; see also U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP.,
STUDY OF AIRLINE COMPUTER RESERVATION SYSTEMS (1988).
5 Telephone Interview with David A. Schwarte, Executive Vice-President and
General Counsel, Sabre, Inc. (Feb. 16, 2004).
6 Cindy R. Alexander & Yoon-Ho Alex Lee, The Economics of Regulatory Reform:
Termination of Airline Computer Reservation System Rules, 21 YALE J. ON REG. (forth-
coming 2004) (clarifying that deregulation, conceptually and practically, does
not necessarily end government intervention because "the relevant alternative to




like."7 First, the competitive environment between airlines and
CRSs is unprecedented, as no airline has a controlling stake in
any CRS. Second, into the 1990s, travel agents booked almost
all airline travel reservations, but modernly, alternative distribu-
tion channels, of which the Internet is the most impressive, have
found commercial applications. Accordingly, consumers are
empowered to affirmatively avoid intermediaries and transac-
tional costs by accessing services and products directly from air
carriers for free.9 Third, a fundamental predicate of CRS regu-
lation has been turned inside-out. That is, in the early period of
airline deregulation, government authorities, if not the airline
industry players themselves, were concerned about muscular,
dominant carriers using the very CRSs they owned and con-
trolled as weapons against new entrants and/or existing carri-
ers.10 In fact, today, so-called low fare point-to-point carriers
such as Southwest Airlines and JetBlue Airways, whose business
models stimulate direct on-line bookings, are the muscular,
profitable airlines, not the so-called hub-and-spoke-based legacy
carriers.11 Finally, arguably, the CRS rules themselves have
played no role in stimulating or sustaining low-cost carriers or
competition within the deregulated commercial airline market-
place, achieving instead the undesired and pernicious purpose
of insulating CRSs from competition even among themselves. 12
Consequently, the DOT has reassessed the need for regulation
and opted, after a lengthy seven-year comment period, to der-
egulate the CRS industry.
This article presents salient features of the DOT's decision to
deregulate the CRS industry and is based upon examination of
the entire DOT CRS rulemaking docket and related scholarship.
Part II provides a review of CRS regulations and related ratio-
nales for deregulation.13 Part III explores what the DOT re-
7 Steven P. Sawyer, Address at the ABA Forum on Air & Space Law, 2003 An-







13 See Robert Bruce Wark, Observations on the End to CRS Regulation: Two Points of
View, 18 AIR & SPACE LAw. 12, 14 (2004) ("By the time the DOT called for com-
ments on its proposed rules in 2002, the debate was not whether deregulation
was the right goal but rather what might be the best method to accomplish that
goal.").
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gards as the catalysts of CRS deregulation, namely airline
divestiture of CRS ownership and the application of e-commerce
to the airline industry. Part V offers an international perspective
by reviewing deregulation impulses in the European Union and
Canada. Finally, Part VI reiterates support of the long-antici-
pated CRS deregulation, but cautions that still-existent counter-
vailing arguments to CRS deregulation may be revisited if
market forces and/or antitrust enforcement are unable to effect
competitive discipline and ensure industry and consumer
welfare.
II. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
In the infancy of commercial air travel, the manner in which
airlines made and tracked reservations was simple, reflecting
supply and demand of a not-yet-penetrated, unsaturated market.
Airline management relied on rudimentary and manual docu-
ment-retention and retrieval systems to orchestrate flight times,
seat assignment, and the like. Airline travel agents mechanically
created and/or maintained records by, for example, retrieving
records around a "Lazy Susan" or using binoculars to read flight
availability.' 4 The acute need for quicker, electronic technology
presented itself, however, as the number of consumers using air-
line travel increased exponentially, outpacing infrastructure. 15
Practical needs and chance motivated airline research and de-
velopment of modern CRSs. As one narrator tells:
One day in 1953 an IBM sales representative named Blair Smith,
finding himself on an American [Airlines] flight sitting next to
[American Airlines founder] C.R. Smith, discovered that their
surnames were only the first coincidence. Smith of American ex-
plained his frustration in managing reservations while Smith of
IBM betrayed his eagerness to make a sale. Before long IBM had
a contract to apply the war-making technology [of a Cold War
computer system] to American's computer reservations
problems. IBM called the project SABER, for Semi-Automatic
Business Environment Research. For nearly a decade the project
engineers toiled. Along the way, in 1959, an American executive
flipping through a magazine stopped at an ad for the 1960 Buick
LeSabre; he transposed the last two letters of the acronym and
14 Barry C. Smith et al., E-Commerce and Operations Research in Airline Planning,
Marketing, and Distribution, 31 INTERFACEs 37, 38-39 (2001).
15 Timothy M. Ravich, Re-Regulation and Airline Passengers'Rights, 67J. AIR L. &
COM. 935, 976-986 (2002).
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called the system Sabre. It would become, in every respect, the
weapon that its name implied.16
And so, American Airlines had its Sabre. United Airlines
countered with Apollo. Worldspan developed as a merger be-
tween Northwest Airlines's PARS system and TWA's and Delta's
DATAS. Eventually, European interests entered the CRS market
(vis-A.-vis Amadeus) by purchasing Continental Airlines's "System
One" or "SODA," which itself was a critical asset and product of
Eastern Airlines. There were others systems, too. Each such sys-
tem originally was developed, owned, and marketed by an air-
line for use by travel agents and travel agencies.' 7 In an early
period of CRS development, CRSs were for internal airline use
and, therefore "were production tools, rather than systems of
demand enhancement; they presented few opportunities for ex-
ploitation of principal-agent relationships because employees of
the customer airline generally did their own booking and inven-
tory management using the system hardware and software pro-
vided by the vendor."'" Once developed, CRS technology
helped airlines to maximize their revenue and capture impor-
tant marginal dollars by automating an airline's manipulation of
flight inventories, rates, routes, services, restrictions, and the
like. Moreover, CRS technology incentivized airlines to provide
their CRSs to travel intermediaries (i.e., travel agents and travel
agencies). The business advantages of CRS technology for a
CRS-owning airline against competitors airlines without CRS
ownership were obvious." After all, inasmuch as they were orig-
16 THOMAS PETZINGER JR., HARD LANDING 60 (1995); see also Larry G. Locke,
Flying the Unfriendly Skies: The Legal Fallout Over the Use of Computerized Reservation
Systems as a Competitive Weapon in the Airline Industry, 2 HAzv. J.L. & TECH. 219, 221
(1989) ("CRS technology created more than just enhanced technical efficiency
for travel agents and airlines. It also created opportunities for proprietary air-
lines to exploit the system as a competitive weapon.").
17 By regulation, a travel agent or travel agency using a CRS is referred to as a
"subscriber." In 2002, the generally-regarded major airlines ceased paying base
commissions to travel agencies in the United States, deciding instead to use in-
centive commissions. See Dep't of Transp., Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
Computer Reservations System (CRS) Regulations, 67 Fed. Reg. 69,366, 69,371
(November 15, 2002) [hereinafter NPRM]. See generally Ian E. Pate, Comment, In
re Travel Agency Commission Antitrust Litigation: A Case of Nonprice Predation within
the Travel Industry, 64J. AIR L. & CoM. 941 (1999) (concluding that "airlines were
engaging in collusion and conspiracy to eliminate travel agencies").
18 Michael E. Levine, Airline Competition in Deregulated Markets: Theory, Firm Strat-
egy, and Public Policy, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 393, 459 (1987).
19 See generally Marj P. Learning, Note, Enlightened Regulation of Computerized Res-
ervations Systems Requires a Balance Between Consumer Protection and Profitable Airline
20041
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inally developed by airlines, CRSs were a proprietary interest
and asset of individual airlines, not of the airline industry gener-
ally.2" Consequently, the DOT reasoned that airlines that devel-
oped and owned CRSs had an incentive to prejudice
distribution channels in their favor.21
Regulation of the CRS industry specifically arose out of con-
cern that a deregulated CRS market would allow intolerable
competitive tactics by and among airlines to the detriment of
airline consumers. CRS regulation sought to prevent, among
other things, airlines that owned CRSs from using their systems
as a competitive weapon. Statistical and practical accounts of
industry and consumer reliance on CRSs bolstered the policy
underpinnings of CRS regulation. For example, by 1999, travel
agents sold almost seventy-five percent of all airline tickets,
ninety-three percent of which were made through an airline-
provided CRS as to domestic flights.22 Potential passengers
came to rely on travel agents and travel agencies in making air
travel plans. CRSs, after all, offered travel agents and travel
agencies a constant and up-to-date inventory of ever-changing
fares, schedules, conditions, and restrictions. Dynamically, CRSs
showed travel agents schedules, fares, and seat availability for
flights across markets. CRSs encouraged sales by providing in-
termediaries with the convenience and capability of correspond-
ing a depth of airline offerings to any given customer's needs.23
Arguably then, CRSs were the virtual bloodstream of an airline,
representing prime access to and a preferred source of revenue
and passengers.24 Some have reasoned that airline control of a
Marketing, 21 TRANsP. L.J. 469 (1993) ("The burgeoning air transportation mar-
ket became dependent on the technological innovation of the CRS.").
20 Curse of the Mommy Tomb, supra note 4, at 8 ("There were a number of coop-
erative efforts to set up a common industry system, but all failed, in part because
the government hinted that they might violate antitrust laws.").
21 Airlines have been accused of using data on other airlines' fares to reduce
competition. See United States v. Airline Tariff Publ'g Co., 836 F. Supp. 9
(D.C.D.C. 1993); 59 Fed. Reg. 15,225 (Mar. 31, 1994).
22 NPRM, supra note 17, at 69,371 (citing Bear, Stearns & Co., Point, Click, Trip:
An Introduction to the On-Line Travel Agency, Apr. 2000, at 17).
23 Id. at 69,372.
24 Learning, supra note 19, at 477 ("As the CRS became the cornerstone of a
blossoming automated industry, profitability became even more dependent on
producing, distributing, and retrieving timely and accurate information."); see
also Kevin J. Johnson, Computer Reservations System Participation: Is It Still Necessary
forSmaller Carriers?, 11 AiR & SPACE LAW. 9, 12 (1997) ("Even with all of the distri-
bution alternatives that are springing up today, CRS participation is still the most
efficient means of reaching the widest audience for a carrier's services.").
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CRS had become a "survival characteristic" of any viable deregu-
lated airline, such that the demise of some airlines during the
deregulated period (for example, People Express) occurred in
part because of the lack of a competitive CRS.25 In all, CRSs
clearly had important leverage in the airline business and the
degree to which the CRSs exercised or could exercise that
power concerned regulators.
The suspicion that airline-owned CRSs could be and were be-
ing used to negate the competitiveness of the airline industry
and prejudice the consumer welfare generated CRS regula-
tion.26 United States Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer,
while a judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit, distilled the critique of CRSs as follows:
First, [critics] argue that the CRS-owning airlines bias the pro-
grams and displays in their own favor. Carrier A, for example,
may use a computer algorithm that lists all of its own connections
before it lists any connection with other airlines .... Second, a
synergy between airline ownership and ownership of a CRS per-
mits the CRS-owning carrier to protect its market position in
both the CRS and airline industries. An airline dominant in a
particular region can offer powerful inducements to travel agents
in that area to use its CRS system .... Third, the critics argue
that an owner may use information stored in the CRS about each
passengers' itinerary, class of service, fare code, and so forth, for
anticompetitive purposes... [as] [t]his information offers valua-
ble insights into market responses to new fares, routes, or
services.27
The first set of CRS regulations, arising in 1984, purportedly ad-
dressed these concerns. 28 "[T] he CRS rules were meant to ame-
25 See, e.g., Paul Stephen Dempsey, The Disintegration of the U.S. Airline Industry,
20 TRANsP. LJ. 9, 14 (1991) (identifying other characteristics of successful der-
egulated air carriers, including: multiple hubs, frequent flier programs, sophisti-
cated yield management, fuel efficient fleet of standardized aircraft, low debt, low
wages and flexible work rules, superior service, and international routes); see also
Paul Stephen Dempsey, Antitrust Law and Policy in Transportation: Monopoly I$ the
Name of the Game, 21 GA. L. REv. 505, 596 (1987); RIGAS DoGANIs, FLYING OFF
COURSE: THE ECONOMICS OF INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES 278 (Routledge 1991) ("It is
going to be critical for airlines not only to join global or regional computer reser-
vation systems but also to make optimum use of the database CRS can provide in
order to maximize their revenues and improve their marketing. Airlines that fail
to do this in the years ahead will find themselves losing the competitive battle.").
26 See, e.g., Locke, supra note 16, at 219.
27 Stephen G. Breyer, Antitrust, Deregulation, and the Newly Liberated Marketplace,
75 CAL. L. REv. 1005, 1035 (1987).
28 49 Fed. Reg. 32,540 (Aug. 15, 1984); see also United Airlines v. CAB, 766 F.2d
1107 (7th Cir. 1985). The 1992 CRS regulations were set to expire (or sunset) on
2004] 393
394 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
liorate potential abuses that could be directly attributed to
vertically integrated airlines and systems. ' 29 In particular, the
DOT's CRS regulations were predicated on an antitrust princi-
ple holding that each CRS was a monopolist whose "essential
facilities" must be made available to all airlines and travel
agents? ° Over time however, the rationale underlying CRS reg-
ulation changed radically because the structure of CRS owner-
ship and the technologies facilitating distribution of airline
offerings changed in revolutionary ways.
CRS deregulation is the product of many years of DOT con-
sideration and review of the regulatory environment. In 1994,
the DOT set out to revisit its original 1984 CRS regulations,
which were amended in 1992 and scheduled to sunset on De-
cember 31, 1997. In 1992, the DOT began, but never finished, a
comprehensive study of CRSs 1 In 1997, the DOT formalized
December 31, 1997. In 1994, therefore, the DOT announced that it was review-
ing the CRS regulations. See Donald J. Boudreaux & Jerome Ellig, Beneficent Bias:
The Case Against Regulating Airline Computerized Reservation Systems, 57 J. AIR L. &
COM. 567 (1992).
29 Reply Comments of Northwest Airlines, Inc. at 5, In the Matter of Computer
Reservations System (CRS) Regulations, OST-99-5888 (June 9, 2003) (on file with
the author). See generally, Margaret E. Guerin-Calvert, Vertical Integration as a
Threat to Competition: Airline Computer Reservation Systems in THE ANTITRUST
REVOLUTION 338-70 (John E. Kwoka & Lawrence White eds., 1989).
30 See, e.g., Ernest Gellhorn & Richard Liebeskind, Computer Reservations Systems:
To Regulate or Not? - Flawed DOT Jurisdiction and Antitrust Rationale, 17 AIR & SPACE
LAw. 18, 19 (2003); see also Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, 948 F.2d 536
(9th Cir. 1991); see also In re Passenger Computer Reservations Sys. Antitrust Li-
tig., 694 F. Supp. 1443 (C.D. Ca. 1988).
31 Gelhorn & Liebeskind, supra note 30, at 18. In 1993, the National Commis-
sion to Ensure a Strong Competitive Airline Industry (the "National Airline Com-
mission"), which was chaired by Virginia Governor Gerald L. Baliles, was asked in
its enabling legislation to review a wide variety of issues including airline com-
puter reservation systems. See Airport and Airway Safety, Capacity, Noise Im-
provement and Intermodal Transportation Act of 1992, 49 U.S.C. App. 1371,
§ 204(d) (3) (E) (as amended by Pub. L. No. 103-13 (April 7, 1993)). Many in
Congress pressured the National Airline Commission to propose strict regula-
tions on CRSs, as well as on frequent flyer programs. Some believed that CRSs
were unfairly used by some carriers to re-direct traffic to their own airlines at the
expense of others. Such suggestions, however, did not play out given that the
1984 CRS regulations were amended in 1992, the year prior to the National Air-
line Commission's meetings. For that matter, the National Airline Commission
did not see any convincing evidence that these kinds of things were causing, in
any way, the industry's problems. So, the National Airline Commission stated in
its "Chairman's Summary": "Some of the issues we were asked to study, such as
computer reservations systems and frequent flyer programs, after careful exami-
nation required no action by this Commission." NATIONAL COMMISSION TO EN-
SURE A STRONG COMPETITIVE AIRLINE INDUSTRY. CHANGE. CHALLENGE AND
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its review of the CRS regulations, culminating in a November 15,
2002 "Notice of Proposed Rulemaking" (the "NPRM"). 2 The
2002 NPRM welcomed comments about the state of existing
CRS rules and noted: "two developments that may enable us to
reduce our regulation of the CRS business. Those develop-
ments are the growing role of the Internet in airline distribution
and the diminishing airline ownership of the systems. 3 Finally,
on New Year's Eve Day 2003, the DOT deregulated the entire
CRS industry. The DOT recognized that, "[d]ue to the owner-
ship changes and technological changes in the CRS business,
competition between the systems is no longer a direct form of
airline competition. '34 On January 7, 2004, the DOT issued its
formal Final Rule respecting its CRS oversight, deciding that af-
ter twenty years of government supervision that "virtually all CRS
regulation should be ended," with the caveat that the DOT was
willing to adopt rules regulating CRSs only if reasonably neces-
sary to prevent anti-competitive or deceptive practices that are
likely to occur without the benefit of market discipline. 5 The
DOT allowed its CRS regulations to sunset on January 31, 2004,
but provided for a transition period up until July 31, 2004, to
sunset its rules respecting display bias and so-called parity-
clauses.
III. CRS AIRLINE DIVESTMENT AND THE INTERNET
Changes in CRS ownership coupled with the commercializa-
tion of the Internet sustained CRS deregulation impulses. In
the course of making its recommendations to the DOT regard-
ing CRS regulation, the Department of Justice (the "DOJ") iso-
lated two features that weakened the rationale supporting CRS
regulation. Specifically, the DOJ recognized that "divestiture of
CRSs from their airline owners, which affects the CRSs' incen-
tives to diminish airline competition, and increased airline use
of the Internet to bypass CRSs, which creates some distribution
competition, have lessened the need for industry-wide regula-
COMPETITION, at 3 (Aug. 1993). The National Airline Commission could have
put this in the form of a formal recommendation, but did not in deference to the
members of Congress who had pushed for restrictions on the CRSs and frequent
flyer programs. Telephone Interview with Gregory 0. Principato, National Air-
line Commission Executive Director (May 18, 2004).
32 NPRM, supra note 17, at 69367.
33 Id.
34 Computer Reservations System (CRS) Regulations; 69 Fed. Reg. 976, 1010
(January 7, 2004) (citing 67 Fed. Reg. 69,406) [hereinafter Final Rule].
35 Id. at 1001.
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tion."' 6 These two developments revolutionized the CRS regula-
tory environment.
When making travel plans, consumers traditionally relied
upon the expertise and efforts of travel agents and travel agen-
cies to locate appropriate airline booking information. Over-
whelmingly, travel agents and travel agencies used airline-
provided and/or airline-owned CRSs for this purpose. In turn,
CRSs collected subscriber fees from travel agents (subject to
other contractual arrangements) and the airlines paid CRS
booking fees for the value of securing fares. In a traditional dis-
tribution scheme, then, CRSs virtually were alone as a distribu-
tion channel of airline offerings. While the reciprocal flow of
fares for transportation was direct between passenger and air-
line, access to flight-related information necessarily passed
through intermediaries, namely the CRSs upon which travel
agents and travel agencies depended. Therefore, airline control
of CRSs was critical, translating into revenue and market share.
Stated another way, an airline's control of a CRS theoretically
served to limit, if not exclude, that airline's competitors from
booking passengers. The traditional path of distribution of air-
line services has been illustrated as follows: 37
Traditional Travel Agency Distribution





Travel lincentives /Agencies & )lnformation/ seribeboo.kins fea
36 Reply Comments of the Department of Justice at 3, In the Matter of Com-
puter Reservations System (CRS) Regulations, 0S-99-5888 (June 9, 2003) (on
file with the author).
s7 Chart reprinted from Greg A. Sivinski, DOT Computer Reservations System Rules
Protect CRS Market Power and Insulate High-Cost Channels of Travel Distribution 4, an
article presented at the American Bar Association Air & Space Law 2002 AnnualMeeting and Conference (Hollywood, Fla.) (Nov. 8, 2002).
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In this traditional distribution scheme, airline ownership of
CRSs fueled antitrust and consumer protection concerns and
may have been the most significant obstacle to CRS deregula-
tion. The DOT reasoned that CRSs did not need to compete for
airline participation and that because
[T]he airlines that controlled the systems had the incentive
and the ability to use them to prejudice the competitive position
of non-owner airlines and to provide information on airline ser-
vices through the systems to travel agents that gave an undue
preference to the services operated by the owner airlines[and,]
[c]ompetitive market forces did not discipline the prices and
terms for services offered by systems to participating airlines.3"
In other words, the traditional distribution scheme skewed
power in the air travel reservation market in favor of CRS-own-
ing airlines. Accordingly, CRS regulations theoretically served
to protect the consumer welfare by blunting the use of CRSs as a
competitive tool. The DOT specifically believed that the CRSs,
at the center of a traditional distribution scheme, maintained
market power over most airlines. 9
Others, however disagreed. For example, The Regulatory
Studies Program at George Mason University's Mercatus Center
noted:
Both the existing rules and the current DOT proposals presume
that the systems have market power over the airlines and travel
agencies. Our analysis, on the other hand, suggests that the in-
tense competition in the travel agency business coupled with the
emergence of system alternatives is likely to have a counter-bal-
ancing effect on any alleged market power. Given thin profit
margins, large numbers of incumbents, and low barriers to entry,
travel agencies remain extremely alert to any innovation that
would benefit their consumers. This alertness gives the agencies
38 Final Rule, supra note 34, at 1001.
39 Alfred Kahn, Deregulatory Schizophrenia, 75 CAL. L. Rxv. 1059, 1060 (1986)
(explaining that deregulation policy is not inconsistent with antitrust enforce-
ment: "Preserving equality of competitive opportunity is not, in principle, the
same thing as suppressing or supplanting competition"). See also STEVEN A. MOR-
RISON & CLIFFORD WINSTON, THE EVOLUTION OF THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY 33 (The
Brookings Institute 1995) ("A final possible barrier to competition is computer
reservation systems. The carrier that owns a system has a potential competitive
edge because it is easier for travel agents who use the system to obtain informa-
tion about that carrier's flights.").
398 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [69
a degree of bargaining power against the systems and airlines
since both need travel agencies for bookings.40
The DOT's characterization of each CRS as an independent
market unto itself for antitrust purposes also drew ridicule. Two
critics argued that:
[M] odern antitrust analysis focuses on the welfare of consumers,
not competitors. The goal of antitrust is to promote competition
because it benefits consumers. The usual starting point, there-
fore, is to analyze an industry from the perspective of the con-
sumer-here, the airline passenger-and ask whether individual
CRSs have the power to reduce competition to the passengers'
detriment. Instead DOT starts from the high-cost airlines' per-
spective. It is undeterred by the experience of profitable low-
cost/low-fare airlines, such as Southwest and JetBlue, that have
developed distribution systems that do not rely heavily on CRSs
and make CRSs compete for their business. DOT asserts instead
that high-cost airlines must have access to every travel agent, the
specific CRSs provide the only access to some travel agents, and
that each CRSs service is invaluable and essential. Therefore,
DOT concludes, each CRS is a separate and distinct market and
CRS has market power.4'
Another commentator noted that "the two most important an-
titrust charges [against CRS vendors], that of market power and
display preference, appear theoretically incorrect and derived
from important misunderstandings about how competition
works in the CRS industry. These misunderstandings have led
to unwarranted policy actions in this area."42 CRS regulation ap-
peared inescapable, however, so long as airlines maintained
ownership interests in any CRS. Momentum for CRS deregula-
tion accelerated as CRSs became independent from the airlines
and shed any incentive, theoretical or actual, to favor one car-
rier over another. Indeed, in the 1980s, one commentator
forecast the likelihood of CRS deregulation if airlines divested
ownership and control of CRSs, arguing that:
40 Anil Caliskan and Jay Cohran, III, Public Interest Comment on Computer Reserva-
tions Systems, published by the Mercatus Center, George Mason University, at 6
(Mar. 15, 2003).
41 Gellhorn & Liebeskind, Computer Reservations Systems: To Regulate or Not? -
Flawed DOT Jurisdiction and Antitrust Rationale, supra note 30, at 21.
42 Andrew N. Kleit, Computer Reservations Systems: Competition Misunderstood, 37
ANTITRUST BULL. 833 (1992).
43 See David A. Schwarte, Address at the ABA Forum on Air & Space Law,
Spring Update Conference: Aviation: The Second Century (Washington, D.C.)
(Mar. 18, 2004).
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[A] simpler and more effective solution would be to terminate
ownership relations between the reservation service and the air-
lines. The services could be independent businesses that would
provide the service to airlines and travel agents. An independent
operator would have strong incentives to provide equal, non-ma-
nipulative treatment of users. By changing structural relation-
ships, regulatory controls over conduct could be minimized.4 4
Ultimately, the DOT was persuaded that " [t] he major predicate
for the rules has always been the systems' control by airlines.
The U.S. airlines' divestiture of their ownership interests has
eliminated that basis for the rules."45
The second great development facilitating CRS deregulation
was the growth of the Internet as a shopping tool for airline
passengers. The Internet is essentially a second-generation CRS,
as the CRS pioneered the first business-to-business electronic ex-
change of information, and provided "a new interface for one of
the largest, most complex, and most successful electronic com-
merce systems developed before Internet commerce was possi-
ble. '46 The Internet provided consumers with two alternatives.
44 Peter C. Carstensen, Evaluating 'Deregulation' of Commercial Air Travel: False
Dichotomization, Untenable Theories, and Unimplemented Promises, 46 WASH. & LEE L.
Ruv. 109, 134 (1989) (internal footnote omitted); see also Pam Fair, Comment,
Anti-Competitive Aspects of Airline Ownership of Computerized Reservation Systems, 17
TRANsP. LJ. 321 (1989); Kleit, supra note 42, at 860-62; James Weiss, Computer
Reservation Systems, 20 TRANSP. LJ. 1 (1991); Jerome Ellig, Computer Reservations
Systems, Creative Destruction, and Consumer Welfare: Some Unsettled Issues, 19 TRANSP.
L.J. 287 (1991).
45 Final Rule, supra note 34, at 977. Under 49 U.S.C. § 41712, the DOT is
authorized to prohibit airlines and "ticket agents" from engaging in unfair com-
petition and deceptive practices in the sale or provision of air transportation.
Inasmuch as airlines have divested from CRS ownership, the DOT's jurisdictional
grounds to enforce such prohibition against non-airline owned CRSs is
uncertain.
46 Jane Kaufman &James R. Wrathall, Who Owns the Customer? The Emerging Law
of Commercial Transactions in Electronic Customer Data, 56 Bus. LAw. 213, 217 (2000)
("The regulation of the airline CRS system is an early example of the importance
of data warehousing and customer profiling to competition in global markets.");
see also Peggy J. Hoyt, Comment, Developing Antitrust Policy on the Internet: Lessons
from the Airline Industry, 28 TRANSP. LJ. 315 (2001); Aimee Minick, Comment,
Computer Reservations Systems, Airlines, and the Internet, 65 J. AIR L. & COM. 891
(2000) (examining "whether or not the current regulations apply to the Internet
CRS or, if in the current business climate, the regulations are still necessary");
Mark S. Nadel, The Consumer Product Selection Process in an Internet Age: Obstacles to
Maximum Effectiveness and Policy Options, HARv. J.L. & TECH. 183, 189 (2000)
("Find[ing] that improvements in information processing technologies justify a
reevaluation of regulations that limit competition out of fear that consumers may
be unqualified to make good choices.").
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First, in comparison to the traditional distribution path illus-
trated above, the Internet streamlined traditional travel agency
distribution by offering a direct channel between the service




In this scheme, the Internet reformulated the airline industry's
cost structure, reducing the costs of ticket distribution by ap-
proximately half, "often eliminating traditional travel agent ser-
vices, lowering transaction costs, and allowing airlines to fill
otherwise empty seats through low-price Internet deals."48 The
Internet encouraged airlines to communicate directly with their
target market with minimal transactional expenses. For exam-
ple, in the United States and Europe, alike, the Internet has
stimulated some commercial airlines, particularly low-cost carri-
ers, to apply a fresh approach to using airline livery as a market-
ing tool, painting airplane fuselages and/or engines nacelles
with "dot com" addresses (e.g., JetBlue.com and easyJet.com,
47 Chart reprinted from Sivinski, supra note 37, at 5.
48 John R. Mietus, Jr., Recent Developments in Aviation, 28 TRANSP. LJ. 229, 237
(2001) (discussing impulses to regulate airline distribution practices involving
the Internet); see also Reply Comments of Orbitz, LLC at 4, In the Matter of Com-
puter Reservations System (CRS) Regulations, OST-99-5888 (October 23, 2000)
("Entrenched incumbents such as Sabre/Travelocity and Microsoft/Expedia
have recommended that the Department extend the full range of CRS Rules to
some Internet travel websites and not to others, attempting to either exempt
their own sites from any regulation or to disadvantage online competitors for
whom there is no empirical justification for regulation."); see also Harrell Associ-
ates, The Internet Travel Industry: What Consumers Should Expect and Need to Know,
and Options for a Better Marketplace, June 6, 2002, at 9.
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etc.). Second, the Internet avoided the role of travel agencies,
offering a more direct channel for consumers.49 That is, web-
sites such as Expedia.com, Orbitz.com, 50 and Travelocity.com
arose to put consumers themselves in the shoes of CRS-using
travel agents and travel agencies: 51






The Internet as a shopping tool motivated the DOT to con-
sider that perceived or actual CR8 market power was eroding
because of the evolution of altrnative air line ticket distribution
vehicles.5 2 Thus, the fundamental premises of CRS regulation
had disappeared.53 In the end and in the DOT's own words:
Airlines are selling an increasingly large share of their tickets
through their Internet websites and a diminishing share through
49 Note, The Legal and Regulatory Implications of Airline Computer Reservation Sys-
tems, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1930, 1947 (1990) ("Technological change may overrun
any potential 'bottleneck' of travel agents as the sole distribution source and obvi-
ate the need for regulatory interference.").
- See generally William F. Adkinson, Jr. & Thomas M. Lenard, Orbitz: An Anti-
trust Assessment, 16 ANTITRUST 76 (2002).
51 Chart reprinted from Sivinski, supra note 37, at 6.
52 RIGAS DOGANIS, THE AIRLINE BUSINESS IN THE 21ST CENTURY 169 (Routledge
2001) (identifying the Internet as a driver pushing airlines into e-commerce and
suggesting that "the ability of travel agents to influence customers' choice of air-
line is declining [and that] effective use of the Internet provides airlines with
increased marketing power").
53 See, e.g., Reply Comments of Northwest Airlines, Inc. at 5, In the Matter of
Computer Reservations System (CRS) Regulations, OST-99-5888 (June 9, 2003)
("Today, [however,] that foundation, and the rules that it engendered are a relic
of a bygone era.") (on file with the author).
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travel agencies using a system. The airlines' control over access
to their webfares, the discounted fares originally offered only
through individual airline website, has enabled them to obtain
lower fees from two of the systems. And travel agencies are in-
creasingly demanding-and winning-contracts from the sys-
tems that give them more freedom to use alternative booking
channels and to switch systems periodically.54
Consequently, "[t]his dramatic change in circumstances has
eviscerated the original rationale for the rule s as a shield against
competitive harms stemming from the potential for airline own-
ers to leverage the market power of CRSs."5 5 Indeed, in the
early stages of CRS deregulation, airlines likely will use the In-
ternet itself as leverage against CRS vendors.5 6
IV. SURVEY OF DOT'S NEW RATIONALE
The DOT has cancelled all but two CRS regulations, namely
those concerning display bias and so-called parity clauses in air-
line participating carrier agreements. Both such rules will ex-
pire on July 31, 2004.
A. DISPLAY BIAs
A distinguishing feature of CRS regulation was the DOT's pro-
hibition against display bias. As a definitional matter, display
bias refers to the literal position of an airline's flight offerings
on a computer screen relative to the flight offerings of that air-
line's competitors. Because CRS computer screens are only so
large and can display only so much data, CRS-owning airlines
had every incentive to design CRS software that prejudiced CRS
displays in their favor. The concept and practice of display
54 Final Rule, supra note 34, at 977.
55 Reply Comments of Northwest Airlines, Inc. at 5, In the Matter of Computer
Reservations System (CRS) Regulations, OST-99-5888 (June 9, 2003). See, e.g.,
Bruce Rabinovitz & David Heffernan, Regulation without Justification?, 17 AIR &
SPACE LAw. 1 (2003).
56 See, e.g., John Hughes, American Imposes Fees to Boost Annual Revenue, MIAMI
HERALD, Sept. 3, 2004, at 3C (reporting the plans of American Airlines to charge
fees to customers who book flights through its call centers and airport counters
in order to re-direct customers to the airline's website); see also Northwest Funnels
Business to Websites, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 25, 2004, at 3C (reporting Northwest
Airlines' plan to charge both customers and travel agents extra fees for domestic
tickets that are not booked through its website).
57 Some observers noted:
Studies in the United States have found that the way the informa-
tion is displayed in a computer reservation system has enormous
influence on consumer choices. American Airlines, for example,
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bias underscores the obvious importance of place and position
of any flight listing on a computer screen with a finite amount of
displayable data and lines of text. "Prominence in a commercial
display system is a scarce good. If it is priced at zero, companies
will engage in strategic behavior to get it. This can occur even
in a seemingly objective ordering scheme; that is why the Yellow
Pages, [for example] where the listings are alphabetical, has so
many companies with names like AA-Aabco."58 At the heart of
CRS regulations, then, display bias rules prohibited CRSs from
biasing computer displays in favor of individual airlines, particu-
larly the CRS-owning airline.59 The legal rationale for regula-
tion was that display bias might both harm airline competition
and cause consumers to be misled.6" In fact, airlines that owned
CRSs confronted antitrust lawsuits alleging that CRSs unfairly
prejudiced the displays in order to divert passengers to the CRS-
owning airline itself.61
At the outset of CRS regulation, numerous interests took op-
posing positions about the likely or actual impact of display bias
rules as a deterrent to deceptive consumer practices. Initially,
"[t]he CAB devoted most of its attention to the question of
whether bias [was] unfair to businesses, and never much looked
into the question whether it is harmful to consumers, despite an
entreaty from the Federal Trade Commission that it do so.1'62
For that matter, a partisan characterization of the regulations
prohibiting display bias was that "the point of the campaign
testified to Congress that 92% of all ticket sales come from the first
computer screen displaying information on a given market. 54% of
sales come from the first line on the screen! This creates an over-
whelming incentive for the carriers to bias CRS displays of flight
information to favour the flights of the airline owner of the CRS.
Even if CRS displays are unbiased, a "halo" exists which results in
the agents favouring booking on the airline which owns the CRS.
MICHAEL W. THRETHEWAY & TAE H. OUM, AIRLINE ECONOMICS: FOUNDATIONS FOR
STRATEGY AND POLICY 50 (Centre for Transportation Studies 1992).
58 Curse of the Mommy Tomb, supra note 4, at 56; see also Fred L. Smith, Jr., The
Case for Reforming the Antitrust Regulations (if Repeal is Not an Option), 23 HARv. J.L.
PUB. POL'v 23, 34 (1999) ("The CRS operated much like a supermarket manages
its shelves. Some items would receive priority shelf space, others would warrant
only less preferred space.").
59 The DOT rejected First Amendment-based attacks on its regulation of bias
display, reasoning that its regulation served to protect against misleading adver-
tising. See, e.g., Final Rule, supra note 34, at 1003 (citing Cent. Hudson Gas &
Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980)).
60 Final Rule, supra note 34, at 1002.
61 See, e.g., Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536 (1991).
62 Curse of the Mommy Tomb, supra note 4, at 56.
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against bias was to demand that the government secure for rival
airlines, for free, an increase in listing prominence that they
were quite capable of bidding for. '63 In any event, some analy-
ses of the effects of CRS bias on traveler welfare and airline reve-
nues determined that "travelers would lose $434 million (in
1990 dollars) from CRS bias, with people traveling for pleasure
losing more than business travelers .... Carriers only gain $89
million from bias, for a dead-weight loss-the difference be-
tween carrier gains and traveler losses-of $345 million. 64
However, the result of display bias may be more benign as "the
welfare costs of CRS bias and the effects of redistribution on
carriers are significantly overstated because, in fact, many trav-
elers are not passive consumers."65 That is to say, for some in-
dustry observers, consumers are active investigators of the
airline marketplace. Consequently, the introduction of new dis-
tribution channels into the airline marketplace have allayed the
consumer-protectionist motive underlying display bias regula-
tions. Consumers are no longer (if they ever were) relying
solely or blindly upon a single information stream, and so are
able to make informed travel decisions.66
As introduced in Part III, supra, the Internet and airline di-
vestment from CRS ownership have encouraged an end to dis-
play bias regulations.67 Accordingly, newly-deregulated CRSs
likely will market bias themselves and offer, for example, the
first two of six lines on a computer screen to carriers willing to
offer low rates and to pay a premium.68 In the final analysis, the
63 Id. at 55.
64 MORRISON & WINSTON, supra note 39, at 64.
65 Id. at 66.
66 See, e.g., Paul Stephen Dempsey, Airlines in Turbulence: Strategies for Survival,
23 TRANSP. L.J. 15 (1995) ("Among the most powerful and ubiquitous computer
systems in the world are those owned by airlines. 'They reduce the planet to
microbits of electrons, allowing us to move about Mother Earth with ease, and
book a flight, hotel room, or rental car anywhere we can imagine.' What a pity
that this information stream is becoming so horribly polluted." (quoting Paul S.
Dempsey, Airlines'Polluted Information Stream Harmful to Consumers, Hous. CHRONI-
CLE, Oct. 2, 1994, at 5C.)).
67 See, e.g., Wark, supra note 13, at 12 ("The DOT is betting that other distribu-
tion channels are sufficiently developed to discipline CRS biasing ... consumers
with options to CRS distribution have little incentive to select a biased distribu-
tion channel; thus, a biased CRS should pay a competitive price.").
68 Telephone Interview with David A. Schwarte, Executive Vice-President and
General Counsel, Sabre, Inc. (Feb. 16, 2004); see also Wark, supra note 13, at 13
("CRS discounts in return for access to content, like those now offered by Sabre
and Galileo, were a first in the history of the CRS industry and represent a step in
the right direction-even if ... they do not yet reflect a true market price."). See
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DOT decided neither to delimit the display of code-share flights
nor to bar airlines from distributing software that can bias dis-
plays.69 The DOT noted that "[t] ravel agencies have to compete
against other travel agencies, and their need to satisfy their cus-
tomers should check their willingness to create biased
displays." 70
B. THE MANDATORY PARTICIPATION RULE AND
CONTRACT ISSUES
Another hallmark of the CRS regulations was the so-called
mandatory participation rule. Mandatory participation required
an airline having more than a five-percent interest in a system to
participate in competing systems at the same level at which it
participated in its own system, provided that the other systems'
terms for participation were "commercially reasonable."71 The
mandatory participation rule also required that an airline own-
ing its own CRS provide all systems with fares commonly availa-
ble to subscribers of its own system.7 2 Moreover, in order to
avoid airline dominance over certain markets, the DOT prohib-
ited an airline from tying commissions to use of its CRS because
dominance in the local CRS market would reinforce the air-
line's power in the local airline markets.73
As a corollary to the mandatory participation rule, CRS regu-
lations banned "parity clauses" whereby airlines that owned
CRSs were required to buy at least as high a level of service from
the system as it did from any other system. The DOT reasoned
that parity clauses imposed by CRSs denied airlines the ability to
select their participation level and, therefore, prevented compe-
tition that might otherwise exist. That is, such provisions made
it unnecessary for CRSs to compete for airline participation. Ad-
ditionally, the DOT reasoned that "[p1arity clauses cause air-
lines either to buy more CRS services than they wish to buy from
also Hughes, Revenue, supra note 56, at 3C (relating Sabre Holdings Corp.'s deci-
sion to place Northwest Airlines fares lower in travel agent displays in response to
Northwest's new policy of charging travel agents in order to offset an average
$12.50 per booking.
69 Final Rule, supra note 34, at 1003, 1005.
70 Id. The DOT rejected the contention that its display bias rules violate the
guaranty of free speech under the First Amendment of the United States Consti-
tution. Id. at 1003; see also Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980).
71 Final Rule, supra note 34, at 1009.
72 Id,
73 Id. at 1019.
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some systems or to stop buying services from other systems that
they would like to buy, which creates economic inefficiencies
and injures airline competition. '74 With its latest rulemaking,
the DOT readopted its prohibition against "parity clauses,"
which will end at the end of July, 2004.
Similarly, some CRS regulations mandated access for CRSs to
all airline fares. However, the Internet, with its ability to directly
connect airlines and their potential passengers, has provided
airlines with some leverage in negotiations with CRS vendors.
For example, airlines might refuse to provide CRSs with a com-
plete listing of their fares. In turn, CRSs, craving as much fare
and other data as possible, would pressure airlines to provide all
fare-related information as a condition precedent to the airline
participating in that CRS. This practice is not countenanced by
the remaining CRS regulations. That is, the DOT is barring sys-
tems from requiring an airline, as a condition to participation,
to provide access to fares that the airline does not wish to sell
through the system. 75 The DOT supports this rule because it
believes that a system's demand that an airline provide all pub-
licly-available fares as a condition to any participation would be
anti-competitive. 76 The deregulated CRS marketplace will re-
spond to this reality, for example, as Sabre and Galileo have de-
veloped programs exchanging lower booking fees for
guaranteed access to all publicly-available fares.77 Accordingly,
airlines may be empowered to use their control of webfares as a
way of obtaining lower booking fees. 8
Finally, the DOT revised its rationale underlying regulation of
important travel agency contracts. "Since the first CRS rulemak-
ing, the rules have regulated the systems' contracts with travel
agency subscribers in an effort to give travel agencies a greater
opportunity to switch systems or use multiple systems (or book-
ing channels) .' 79 The DOT regulated "the systems' subscriber
contracts, because practices that limit competition between the
systems were likely to impair airline competition .... Further-
more, system contracts that restrict competition between systems
74 Id. at 1005-06 (citing 62 Fed. Reg. 59,784).
75 Id. at 1007.
76 Id. at 1008.
77 Id. at 1007.
78 Id. at 1008. The DOT rejected Delta's and Northwest's proposal for a rule
prohibiting systems from demanding access to information and benefits such as
frequent flyer awards if an airline has chosen not to provide them.
79 Jd. at 1016.
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(or keep travel agents from using alternative systems and book-
ing channels) would entrench the systems' existing market
power. ... "' Subscriber contracts have changed in the last few
years and the DOT has provided the following reasons for aban-
doning subscriber contract regulation:" l
" CRSs no longer obtain contracts that will keep travel agencies
from using other electronic channels for obtaining informa-
tion and making bookings;
* a declining portion of subscriber contracts contain productiv-
ity pricing provisions; current productivity pricing provisions
allow travel agencies to obtain bonuses (or avoid penalties)
despite booking airline tickets outside the system;
* the length of the term of the typical subscriber contract has
shrunk dramatically; and
* agencies' ability to obtain more flexible contracts is consistent
with the finding that the systems compete aggressively for
travel agency subscribers.
As such, the DOT saw no reason to maintain its existing rules,
given that "market forces are enabling travel agencies to obtain
less restrictive contracts and when the systems' contracts do not
appear to impose unreasonable restraints on the subscribers'
ability to switch systems or use several electronic information
sources and booking channels in addition to their primary
system."8 2
In all, contract as a vehicle for establishing business relation-
ships between airlines and CRSs, will become as important as
ever in the deregulated CRS environment. The DOT's initial
contract-based restrictions were predicated on the rationale that
such clauses tended to maintain each system's market power
and to reduce the ability of airlines to obtain better terms for
participation. 3 As of July 31, 2004, these prohibitions, like the
rules respecting display bias, will end. Initially, "[t]he rule was
intended to keep airlines that owned a system from using their
dominance of regional airline markets to distort competition in
the CRS business. [However,] [b]ecause no system is now
owned by U.S. airlines, the rule currently has no practical effect
on competition.8 1 4 Arguably, in a deregulated CRS environ-
ment, airlines are better positioned to bargain and negotiate
8o Id. at 1016 (citing 57 Fed. Reg. 43,823-24).
81 Id. at 1017.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 1000-01.
84 Id.
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higher participation levels in exchange for better terms of par-
ticipation, an exchange foreclosed by the mandatory participa-
tion rule. 5 As the CRS industry moves out of a regulatory
environment, however, - the only environment the CRS indus-
try has ever known - private contracts will replace government
rules.86 In assessing the transition for regulation to deregula-
tion, some commentators suggest that the success of a transition
from a regulated to a free market may depend upon "the devel-
opment of new institutions and market practices - for example,
contractual arrangements . . . - to replace regulation in circum-
stances where some public policy problems may remain, even if
the regulatory answers do not. 8 7
C. OTHER ABANDONED REGULATIONS
There are other salient features of CRS deregulation worth
mentioning. With respect to "equal functionality" among the
CRSs, the DOT apparently has resolved its concerns about "ar-
chitectural bias," whereby systems were designed to have fea-
tures and functions enabling travel agents to obtain information
and make bookings on the owner airline more reliably and
quickly than on other airlines."8 Thus, the DOT adopted several
rules designed to equalize the functionality for CRS owner and
non-owner airlines and required systems to give all participating
airlines equal access to enhancements. The DOT also required
CRS to provide equal treatment on the loading of information
and prohibited systems from using default features that favored
the owner airline.8 9 The DOT now accepts the position taken by
the DOJ of eliminating the rule requiring equal functionality,
except for a rule requiring equal treatment on the loading of
information. That is, "[a] irlines should be able to bargain over
functionality along with fees. Eliminating the rule, moreover,
could encourage a system to share in the cost and risk of devel-
oping new functions .... "90
At another level, with respect to booking fees and differential
pricing, the rules prohibited CRSs from charging unreasonably
85 Id. at 1010.
86 See Alexander & Lee, supra note 6.
87 John R. Meyer & William B. Tye, Toward Achieving Workable Competition in
Industries Undergoing Transition to Deregulation: A Contractual Equilibrium Approach, 5
YALE J. ON REG. 273, 274 (1988).
88 Final Rule, supra note 34, at 1008.
89 Id. (citing 57 Fed. Reg. 43,814-16).
9o Id. at 1009.
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discriminatory booking fees.91 The DOT is eliminating this rule,
adopting instead a "zero fee rule," barring systems from charg-
ing airlines for participation. 92 In this regime, given the divest-
ment of all airlines from all systems, a CRSs decision to charge
one airline lower fares than another will not be characterized as
discrimination, but as differential pricing. The DOT rational-
ized that: "In most unregulated industries a firm is free to de-
mand better terms from its suppliers, even if its competitors
cannot successfully obtain the same terms."93
The DOT's CRS deregulation also will impact the treatment
of marketing and booking data. Traditionally, systems gener-
ated valuable data from bookings made by their subscribers,
showing how many bookings were being made by individual
travel agencies on individual flights operated by each airline in
each market. Such information facilitated the analyses of traffic
flows in individual airline markets and the booking patterns of
individual travel agencies. 4 The DOT has decided not to adopt
a rule restricting access to this data. Thus, the DOT is eliminat-
ing the rule requiring the systems to make such data available to
all participating airlines.95
Data in the form of third-party hardware and software also will
be impacted. Travel agents had been allowed to use their own
hardware and software in conjunction with a CRS.96 Travel
agents also were allowed to access any database with airline in-
formation or booking facility for airline services from that
equipment. 97 A CRS, however, could determine whether or not
a travel agent/subscriber could access other databases or book-
ing channels if a travel agent used the CRSs' own equipment.98
The DOT now has determined that "the record does not indi-
cate that systems in recent years have been placing roadblocks in
the way of subscriber efforts to use alternative booking chan-
nels." 99 "Furthermore, . . . the systems' subscriber contracts are
giving travel agencies increasingly more flexibility."'100 Conse-
91 14 C.F.R. § 255.6(a).
92 Final Rule, supra note 34, at 1011.
93 Id. at 1011 (citing 67 Fed. Reg. 69,399).
94 Id. at 1013.
95 Id. at 1014. DOT states that individual enforcement against an airline's anti-
competitive use of data is preferable to promulgation of rules on the matter. Id.
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quently, the DOT reasoned that CRSs "will be unable to impose
contractual restrictions on their subscribers that would signifi-
cantly restrict a travel agency's ability to use alternative source of
airline information and booking capabilities, due in large part
to the travel agencies' increasing need to access the Internet. 1 °1
V. AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE
Like the CRS regulations in the United States first effected in
1984, the European Community (the "EC"), in 1989 adopted a
CRS Code of Conduct (the "Code").102 The EC Code was de-
signed both to prohibit the direct use of market power by air-
line-owned CRSs to restrict competition and ultimately to avoid
CRS market power itself.10 3 Deregulation impulses are strong in
the EC and are motivated by the same factors informing the
DOT's decision to deregulate in the United States:
[U] nintended effects of the CRS Code have gained more atten-
tion in recent years, as financially strapped carriers have faced
ever rising booking fees even as they struggle to lower their distri-
bution costs .... At the same time, changes in CRS ownership
and technology are gradually eroding the key features of the
competitive landscape for which the Code was designed. First,
many CRSs have divested their airline ownership. Three of the
four CRSs (Galileo, Sabre and Worldspan) no longer have any
airline ownership, and Amadeus is now 40 percent publicly
owned. Second, the Internet, which allows airlines to sell seats
directly, is decreasing the CRS's role as an essential
intermediary. 104
In the end, three paths seem likely in the EC with respect to
CRS regulation: (1) complete elimination of the CRS Code of
Conduct; (2) elimination both of the requirement that parent
companies participate equally in all CRSs and the prohibition
on discriminatory booking fees and other forms of discrimina-
tion by CRSs; or (3) adoption of a modified CRS Code, preserv-
ing the mandatory participation requirement and
101 Id. at 1015-16.
102 See, e.g., John Roland Mietus, Jr., European Community Regulation of Airline
Computer Reservation Systems, 21 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 93 (1989); Raffaele
Cavani, Computerized Reservation Systems for Air Transport: Remarks on the European
Community Legislation, 43 FoRDHAM INT'L L. REv. 277 (1994).
103 BRATTLE GROUP & NORTON ROSE, STUDY TO ASSESS THE POTENTIAL IMPACT
OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO COUNCIL REGULATION 2299/89 WITH REGARD TO
COMPUTERIZED RESERVATION SYSTEMS iV (Oct. 2003).
104 Id at v.
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corresponding requirement for airline-owned CRS vendors, in
parent carriers' home markets.1 0 5
Meanwhile, in Canada, CRS regulations, which arose in June,
1995, were re-examined in a published report in October
2003.106 As in the airline market in the United States, so too has
the Internet in Canada provided lower-cost distribution options
for Canadian airlines, CRSs, travel agents, and consumer. Ca-
nada's recommendations with respect to the CRS industry in-
clude total deregulation, including deregulation of travel
agency contracts. Moreover, in Canada, airline-CRS relation-
ships would be mostly deregulated although no Canadian air-
lines have CRS ownership. Finally, in contrast to the CRS policy
in the United States, Canada would maintain a ban on biased
displays and would require non-discriminatory access for airlines
to CRSs except it would allow CRSs to charge airlines differen-
tial rates. 107
VI. CONCLUSION
While neither industry experts nor the very government offi-
cials deregulating the CRS industry purport to predict the fu-
ture of the airline reservations industry, CRS deregulation in the
United States likely will promote innovative distribution
schemes that will benefit the consumers. The degree to which
airlines, specifically, are successful in attaining leverage in nego-
tiating booking fees with CRSs and in reducing their depen-
dence upon CRSs as a primary distribution channel will
determine, in large part, the need for any future regulation.
CRSs, meanwhile, will be challenged to add value to both carri-
ers and travel agents alike. "In the end, the DOT's final
rules ... represent a policy determination that relying on mar-
105 Id.
106 REGULATIONS AMENDING THE CANADIAN COMPUTER RESERVATION SYSTEMS
(CRS) REGULATION, C. GAZ. 3411 (Oct. 23, 2003), available at http://canada-
gazette.gc.ca.partI/20031025/html/reglel5-e.html.
107 The Canadian report recognized that
[I]t is apparent that industry events and technological innovation
have overtaken some of the provisions of the [Canadian] Regula-
tions. However, at the same time, it is recognized that CRSs will
continue to be an important means by which airlines distribute
their air services. Therefore, certain regulatory provisions, specifi-
cally those provisions requiring that the information available
through any CRS operating in Canada is displayed in a comprehen-
sive, unbiased and neutral way, must be maintained.
Id. at 3412-13.
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ket forces, even in an admittedly flawed market, can be prefera-
ble to continued regulation." '
108 See Wark, supra note 13, at 13; see also RichardJ. Fahy, Observations on the End
to CRS Regulation, Two Points of View, 18 AIR & SPACE LAW. 12, 16 (2004) ("Con-
sumers can expect lower ticket costs from the efficiencies of CRS distribution and
competition from direct sales; airlines may achieve lower costs resulting from
CRS distribution deals that were not possible when CRSs were forbidden to en-
gage in price discrimination; and travel agencies will benefit from the flexibility
of terms CRSs [might offer].").
